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statutory variations that exist in the collateral source rule across state jurisdictions and the
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*PREFATORY NOTE:  At a NAFE session at the 2005 Eastern Economic Association 
Meetings Matthew McCabe presented a paper entitled "The Economics of the Collateral 
Source Rule."  Among his discussant's remarks for the paper David Schap noted that the 
work then to date failed to include a complete survey of statutory law in the states 
concerning the collateral source rule and that accomplishing such a survey would 
constitute useful additional research.  With the approval and cooperation of McCabe, 
Feeley and Schap undertook the task of such a survey, not initially appreciating the 
enormity of the task.  After many months of gathering and categorizing information the 
survey is nearing completion.  These remarks should help motivate interest in what 




 I. Introduction 
At common law in an action for personal injury or wrongful death, the collateral 
source rule prohibits courts from considering any payments that a plaintiff has received 
due to injury or death from any source other than the tortfeasor.  For example, consider 
an accident insurance policy that gives an individual the right to receive $25,000 for a 
specific type of accidental injury.  If the individual sustains injury in an accident for 
which the injurer is deemed liable, then the individual (or his or her beneficiaries) can 
collect $25,000 from the insurance company in addition to obtaining full damages from 
the injurer (assuming that the individual did not subrogate his or her tort rights to the 
insurer).  The collateral source rule has been summarized by the New York State Court of 
Appeals in the case of Oden v. Chemung County, 87, N.Y.2d 81, 661 N.E.2d 142, 67 
N.Y.S.2d 670 (1995).  The Oden court notes that, “[u]nder traditional common-law 
principles, a personal – injury [or wrongful death] award may not be reduced or offset by 
the amount of any compensation that the injured person may receive from a source other 
than the tortfeasor."1    
Richard A. Posner, Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and 
author of Economic Analysis of Law, contends that the collateral source rule ensures that 
the tortfeasor will bear the full economic cost of the accident.  If the tortfeasor does not 
bear this economic cost, Posner argues that his or her incentive to spend up to the amount 
of the accident cost, appropriately discounted by the probability of accident occurrence, 
to prevent a similar accident in the future will be reduced.  In other words, the collateral 
source rule deters future accidents by placing the full expected cost of the accident upon 
                                                 
1  See Kish v. Board of Educ. Of City of New York, 76 N.Y.2d 379, 384; Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 
206). 
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 the tortfeasor.  When a potential injurer faces the entire expected cost of an accident he or 
she arguably will exercise an efficient level of care to avoid the accident.  Although the 
double recovery may appear as a windfall to the claimant, Posner defends the collateral 
source rule by noting that the claimant buys the insurance policy at a price equal to the 
expected cost of the policy plus the cost of writing the policy.  He argues that the 
premium would be lowered if (1) the insurance provider alters the coverage in order to 
exclude the accident in which the defendant was liable to the plaintiff or (2) the insurance 
provider is subrogated the rights of the plaintiff against the defendant.2   
Despite such advocacy for adherence to the collateral source rule, this common 
law norm has been modified substantially in statutory law in response to pressure by 
medical practitioners and insurers hoping to reduce the cost of litigation.   Although 
Posner contends that the collateral source rule ensures efficient deterrence, opponents of 
the rule argue that double-compensation to victims under the rule decreases the incentive 
for potential victims to themselves take efficient levels of care.  In addition, although 
Posner asserts that the issue of double compensation can be mitigated by a right of 
subrogation, a recent report issued by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) counters 
with three reasons why insurers rarely exercise that right: (1) ascertaining whether a 
specific award covers the same damages as an insurance benefit is arduous, (2) 
administrative costs are expensive, and (3) exercising subrogation rights may 
compromise public opinion of an insurer.3   
Most state tort reforms focus on the notion that too many tort claims are filed and 
that excessive damages are often awarded by the court.  Basing their argument upon this 
                                                 
2  Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th ed., 2003, p. 200. 
3  Elliot, Cary, et al, “The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States,” Congress of the United 
States, Congressional Budget Office, June 2004, p. 6. 
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 presumption, lobbyists against the collateral source rule maintain that decreasing awards 
by the amount of payments from third-party sources will decrease the profitability of 
marginal cases, the number of such cases, and the associated inefficiencies in the tort 
system.  The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) and the National Association 
of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) both advocate for the introduction of evidence 
of collateral source payments at trial.4   NAMIC, for example, asserts, “The Collateral 
Source Rule bars defendants from introducing evidence to show that a plaintiff has 
received collateral source benefits and in so doing, it essentially permits a plaintiff to 
recover damages twice.”5  When a plaintiff receives compensation from his or her 
insurance company and again at trial, NAMIC argues that the proceeds do not represent 
actual compensation for an individual’s injuries, but rather a source of windfall.  
Ultimately, NAMIC contends that consumers pay for these windfalls in the form of 
higher insurance premiums.6 
ATRA similarly advocates for the admissibility of evidence of collateral source 
payments at trial and for offsetting awards by the amount paid to plaintiffs by collateral 
sources, less the amount paid by the plaintiff to secure the benefit.7   Since its 
establishment in 1986 by the American Medical Association and the American Council 
of Engineering Companies, ATRA has sought reformation in the civil judicial system and 
has grown into a nationwide network of state-based liability reform coalitions backed by 
                                                 
4  American Tort Reform Association, “Collateral Source Rule Reform,” Retrieved January 15, 2005 at: 
<http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7344>. 
 National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), “Collateral Source Rule Reform,” 
Retrieved November 27, 2005 at: 
<http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp>. 
5  National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), “Collateral Source Rule Reform.” 
6  National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), “Collateral Source Rule Reform.” 
7  American Tort Reform Association, “Collateral Source Rule Reform,” Retrieved January 15, 2005 at: 
<http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7344>. 
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 135,000 grassroots supporters.8  ATRA contends that ambitious personal injury lawyers 
focus heavily upon certain professions, industries, and companies, which they view as 
opportune and remunerative.  These lawyers, claim ATRA, “…systematically recruit 
clients who may never have suffered a real illness or injury and use scare tactics, 
combined with the promise of awards, to bring these people into massive class action 
suits.”9  As a result, these personal injury lawyers amass multi-million-dollar punitive 
damage awards, which in turn raise social costs by raising premiums for medical 
malpractice insurance and other insurance policies, as well as by compromising access to 
affordable health care.   
In short, because the collateral source rule allows plaintiffs to be compensated 
twice for the same accident, both the expected award and the number of lawsuit filings 
increases.10  In response to the mounting pressure, 39 states and the Virgin Islands have 
enacted statutes that either modify or eliminate the collateral source rule.11   
                                                 
8  American Tort Reform Association (ATRA). “About ATRA.” Retrieved January 15, 2005 at: 
<http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7344>. 
9  American Tort Reform Association (ATRA). “About ATRA.” Retrieved January 15, 2005 at: 
<http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7344>. 
10  Elliot, Cary, et al, “The Effects of Tort Reform: Evidence from the States,” Congress of the United 
States, Congressional Budget Office, June 2004, p. 6. 
11  See Alabama Code §6-5-520; Alaska Statute §09.17.070; Arizona Revised Statutes §12-565; 
California Code §3333.1; Colorado Revised Statute §13-21-111.6; General Statute of 
Connecticut §52-225a; Delaware Code §6862; Florida Statute §768.76; Code of Georgia §51-
12-1; Hawaii Revised Statute §663-10; Idaho Statute §6-1606; Illinois Statutes §735 ILCS 
5/§2-1205 and §735 ILCS 5/§2-1205.1; Indiana Statute §34-44-1; Iowa Code §668.14; 
Kansas Statute §60-38; Kentucky Revised Statute §411.188; Maine Revised Statute §2906, 
under Title 24; Courts and Judicial Proceedings Code of Maryland §3-2A-06 and §3-2A-05; 
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 231, §60G; Michigan Compiled Law §600.6303; 
Minnesota Statute §548.36; Missouri Revised Statute §490-715; Montana Code §27-1-308; 
Nebraska Revised Statutes §44-2819; Nevada Revised Statute §42.020; New Hampshire 
Revised Statute §507-C:7; New Jersey Statute §2A:15-97; New York Consolidated Law 
§4545; North Dakota Century Code §32-03.2-06; Ohio Revised Code §2323.41; Oklahoma 
Statute §1-1708.1D; Oregon Revised Statute §31.580; Pennsylvania Statute §1303.508; 
General Law of Rhode Island §9-19-34.1; South Dakota Statute §21-3-12; Tennessee Code 
§29-26-119; Utah Code §78-14-4.5; Virgin Islands Code §427; Revised Code of Washington 
§7.70.080; and West Virginia Code §55-7B-9a.  Washington D.C. does not modify the 
collateral source rule for torts; however, District of Columbia Code §4-507 allows the court to 
5 of 17
 Utilizing Academic Search Premier, General Reference Center Gold, Lexis-Nexis 
Academic Universe, and EconLit from FirstSearch, we identified several law review 
articles and studies that evaluate the implications of collateral source rule reforms. These 
descriptive reports typically discuss rule reforms only within the context of a single state, 
judicial circuit, or case and generally lack theoretical focus and empirical testing.12  Some 
                                                                                                                                                 
decrease compensation for victims of violent crimes by the amount available to the claimant 
from collateral sources. 
12  Becker, Tiffany Gulley.  “The Collateral Rule in Missouri: Questioning the ‘Double Recovery’ 
Doctrine.”  Missouri Law Review 61:633 (Summer 1996). 
 Clark, Lawrence B. “Symposium on Tort Reform: I. Alabama’s Collateral Source Rule: A Defense 
Attorney’s Perspective.”  Cumberland Law Review  24:416 (1993). 
 Daigle, Danielle A. “The Collateral Source Rule in Alabama: A Practical Approach to Future 
Applications of the Statutes Abrogating the Doctrine.”  Alabama Law Review 53:1249 
(Summer 2002). 
 Danzon, Patricia (1982). “The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims.” Rand R-2870-
ICJ/HCFA. 
 --- (1986). “New Evidence on the Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims.” Rand-R-
3410-ICJ.  
 Eaton, Christopher J.  “The Kansas Legislature’s Attempt to Abrogate the Collateral Source Rule: 
Three Strikes and They’re Out.”  Kansas Law Review 42:913 (Summer 1994). 
 Edwards, David L.  “Jurgensen V. Smith: Shutting the Door on Collateral Source Evidence in South 
Dakota.”  South Dakota Law Review 46:316 (2001). 
 Engler Jr., Frederick N.  “From the ACBA: Editor-in-Chief’s Message: Deconstructing the Collateral 
Source Rule.”  The Lawyers Journal 2:4 (November 17, 2000). 
 Evans, Kamrim.  “Settlements with Nonparties: A Closer Look at Colorado’s Collateral, Source and 
Contribution Statutes.” University of Colorado Law Review 6:195 (Winter 1995). 
 "'Fantasy billing' and the collateral source rule." Wisconsin Law Journal NA (December 14, 




 Farrish, Craig L.  “Restoration of the Collateral Source Rule in Kentucky: A Review of O’Bryan v. 
Hedgespeth.”  Northern Kentucky Law Review 23:357 (Spring 1996). 
 Fleming, John G.  “The Collateral Source Rule and Contract Damages.”  California Law Review 71:1 
(January 1983), p. 56. 
 Galasso, Michael A. “Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Bureau of Highways v. Roof: When 
Should There Be a Requirement to Reduce Awards at the Board of Claims for Benefits 
Received from Collateral Sources?”  Northern Kentucky Law Review 27:430 (2000). 
 Haley, John W.  “Symposium on Tort Reform: II. Alabama’s Collateral Source Rule: A Plaintiff 
Attorney’s Perspective.”  Cumberland Law Review 24:416 (1993). 
 Henderson, Robert A. & Patrick F. Maroney. “Collateral Sources of Indemnity.” Florida State 
University Law Review: 21:571 (Fall 1993). 
 Howard, Jennifer. “Alabama’s New Collateral Source Rule: Observations from the Plaintiff’s 
Perspective.”  Cumberland Law Review 32:573 (2001). 
 Lemley, Charles C. “Applying Florida’s Collateral Source Rule to Veterans’ Benefits.” The Florida 
Bar Journal 69:62 (December 1995). 
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 articles broadly discuss the effects of the collateral source rule reforms and contextualize 
the modifications in conjunction with other tort reform, such as punitive damage caps, 
but these reports fail to describe the variations of the collateral source rule reform among 
all the jurisdictions of the United States.13  Online collateral source rule reform reports, 
established by organizations such as the American Tort Reform Association or the 
National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC), do list tort reform-
related laws that have been enacted in select states.14  Since these reports are maintained 
                                                                                                                                                 
 Passman-Green, Nora J., and Ronald D. Richards Jr. “Who is Winning the Collateral Source Rule 
War?  The Battleground in the Sixth Circuit States.”  Toledo Law Review 31:425 (Spring 
2000). 
 Schafer, Julie A. “The Constitutionality of Offsetting Collateral Benefits Under Ohio Revised Code 
Section 2317.45.”  Ohio State Law Journal 53:587 (Spring 1992). 
 Schwartz, Douglas Hill. “The Tortured Path of Ohio’s Collateral Source Rule.” University of 
Cincinnati Law Review 65:643 (Winter 1997). 
 Ulicny, James.  “Corl v. Huron Castings, Inc.: Wrongful Discharge and the Collateral Source Rule.” 
Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University Law Review 1997:273 (Spring 1997). 
13  Browne, Mark J. & Robert Puelz.  “The Effect of Legal Rules on the Value of Economic and Non-
economic Damages and the Decision to File.” Abstract. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 18:2 
(August 1999) pp. 189-213. 
 Klick, Jonathan & Thomas Stratmann. “Does Medical Malpractice Reform Help States Retain 
Physicians and Does it Matter?” (November 3, 2005).  Available from SSRN. 
 Moorhouse, John C, Andrew P. Morriss & Robert Whaples.  “Law & Economics and Tort Law: A 
Survey of Scholarly Opinion.  Albany Law Review 62:667 (1998). 
 Nockleby, John T. & Shannon Curreri.  “Access to Justice: Can Business Co-Exist with the Civil 
Justice System?: 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and Future of Tort Retrenchment.” Loyola 
of Los Angeles Law Review 38:1021 (Spring 2005). 
 Rubin, Paul H. & Joanna M. Shepherd. “Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths.” (2005) Available from 
the SSRN. 
 Thorpe, Kenneth E. “The Medical Malpractice ‘Crisis’: Recent Trends and the Impact of State Tort 
Reforms.” Health Affairs web exclusive (January 21, 2004). 
 Saine, Christian D.  “Preserving the Collateral Source Rule: Modern Theories of Tort Law and a 
Proposal for Practical Application.”  Case Western Reserve University 47:3 (Spring 1997), p. 
1075. 
 Sloan, Frank, Paula Mergenhagen, & Randall Bovbjerg (1989). “Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value 
of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis.” Journal of Health Politics, Policy, 
and Law 14, pp. 663-698.  
 Viscusi, W. Kip. “Product Liability and Regulation: Establishing the Appropriate Institutional Division 
of Labor.”  AEA Papers and Proceedings 78:2 (May 1988), p. 301-304. 
 ---. “The Performance of Liability Insurance in States with Different Products-Liability Statutes.” 
Journal of Legal Studies 19:809-836. 
14  “Collateral Source Rule Reform.” American Tort Reform Association. Retrieved January 15, 2005 at: 
<http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7344>. 
 “Collateral Source Rule Reform.”  National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.  Retrieved 
November 27, 2005 at: 
<http://www.namic.org/reports/tortReform/CollateralSourceRule.asp>. 
7 of 17
 by special interest groups, however, the information that they contain does not 
necessarily represent an impartial or complete portrayal of all relevant statues.  Indeed, 
the NAMIC website explicitly acknowledges as much:  
NAMIC does not present the information contained in this report as an 
exact and absolute portrayal of all tort reform-related laws that have been 
enacted in every state to date. Rather, it represents a comprehensive listing 
and summary analysis of the existing laws and recently enacted legislation 
specifically identified by NAMIC State and Regulatory Affairs staff as 
generated through its own internal intelligence and legislative and 
regulatory tracking tools as those which bear direct relevance to the key 
facets of tort reform NAMIC supports.15 
 
 In part as a response to the inadequacies in the extant literature, this paper 
addresses the multifaceted statutory (i.e., legislated) reforms to the common law (i.e., 
judge-made, case developed) collateral source rule.  Next follows a description of the 
categorized results based on our survey of statutory law. 
 
II. Collateral Source Rule Reforms  
The statutes of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the 
Virgin Islands (henceforth herein referred to collectively as "the jurisdictions") were 
examined so as to identify the myriad forms that the reforms of the collateral source rule 
have taken.   Categorization of the many types of reform was necessary to give a 
cohesive sense to the substantial amount of information gathered.  A side benefit was that 
upon completion of the categorization process the entire body of information lent itself 
nicely to a tabular presentation. 
                                                 
15  “Collateral Source Rule Reform.”  National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.  Retrieved 




  Our organizing principle in categorizing the information was to create a distinct 
category whenever a type of reform was observed in at least two jurisdictions, but not 
otherwise.  Singular types of reforms have been duly noted by way of exception, to be 
handled as notes in an extensive table rather than by establishing additional categories 
that would be sui generis in character.  In this paper we present the categories of reform, 
but without the notes indicating singular instances of reform since the more extensive 
table is still under construction.  
Among the reforms of the collateral source rule are modifications of exceptions to 
the rule.  We have attempted to classify all reforms as either exceptions to (i.e., erosions 
of) the original rule or as exceptions to the exceptions (i.e., partial returns to) the original 
rule.  These we have identified in the table by way of an intuitive use of minus (-) for 
erosions of the rule or plus (+) for partial returns to it.  Some reforms defy such simple 
classification, most typically when the reform is procedural, and these are identified by 
means of a forward slash (/). 
Our results appear in what we believe are two rather self-explanatory tables.  The 
first presents the categorical results of our survey.  The second makes use of the 
categorical designations to suggest what the status of the rule is in each jurisdiction with 
respect to reforms that have appeared in at least two jurisdictions.  We emphasize that the 
second table is not an accurate summary of statutory law in each particular jurisdiction 
since we have yet to apply to that table the guiding notes that cite singular instances of 
reform where such appear.  Still, the second table gives a sense of how useful our work 
will be for forensic economics practitioners once the notes have been completed and 
attached to the finalized table.  
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 We believe the tabled information can serve as the basis for several worthy papers 
addressing the collateral source rule.  First, we envision a largely tabular summary of 
American law with respect to collateral source rule statutory reform suitable for a law 
review.  Second we wish to fashion a paper containing modified versions of the two 
tables presented here together with the introduction herein as constituting a study worthy 
of placement in a journal read by forensic economists.  Third, the tables once completed 
can serve as a basis for a paper discussing the vested interests at work in shaping 
statutory reform of the collateral source common law norm; indeed, such a paper is 
scheduled for presentation at the forthcoming meetings of the Public Choice Society in 
March/April of this year.  Lastly (or perhaps not if still other paper topics emerge), the 
tables can form the foundation for empirical work assessing the comparative influence of 
special interest groups in either eroding the collateral source rule (insurers and health-
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Bi  - Modified 38
Bii - Eliminated 2
Biii / Neither modified nor eliminated 6
Ci - Insurance payments may be considered 38
Here we present the results of a survey of statutory law concerning the collateral source rule in the fifty states,
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands.
Statute requires consideration of collateral 
source offsets after judgment/award. 14
28
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Fii -
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been received prior to the date of the verdict and 
reduced for collateral source income that is likely 
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Dii - Evidence of collateral source benefits may be introduced only for medical malpractice.
Ei / Statute requires consideration of collateral source offsets during the trial.
Di - Evidence of collateral source benefits may be introduced for medical malpractice.
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The plaintiff may not receive compensation more 
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for violent crimes victim compensation (with 






After the verdict, the plaintiff must send notice of 
the verdict to all persons entitled by contract or 
by law to either subrogation or a lien against the 
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At or before the commencement of an action, the 
plaintiff must send notice of the pending or 
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If collateral source benefits are introduced, then 
plaintiff may introduce evidence that the source 
of such benefits has the right of subrogation or 
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the source of such benefits may neither recover 
any amount against the plaintiff nor be 





Evidence of collateral benefits may not be 
introduced if the source of such benefits has a 
right of subrogation against the proceeds of the 
plaintiff's recovery.
16Hi +
Evidence of collateral benefits may not be 
introduced if the source of such benefits has a 
right to a lien against the proceeds of the 
plaintiff's recovery.
Giii +
If a federal program must by law seek 
subrogation, then the collateral source benefits 
from that federal program may not be 
considered.
29
Gii - Exception to ordinary collateral source rule exists for worker's compensation. 27
Category 
Label Meaning of Category
Total 
Incidence
G Public Sector Collateral Sources
Gi -
Exception to ordinary collateral source rule exists 











H Subrogation and Liens
Statutes Addressing the Collateral Source Rule
( + ) Indicates that the sub-variable erodes the collateral source rule
( - ) Indicates that the sub-variable provides a partial return to the collateral source rule
( / ) Indicates that the sub-variable is procedural or cannot be classified without error
State and Other Select Jurisdictional (DC, PR, VI) 
15 of 17
A
A Bi Bii Biii Biv Ci Cii Ciii Civ Cv Cvi Cvii Di Dii
Alabama 1 1 1 1 1
Alaska 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arizona 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arkansas 1 1
California 1 1 1 1 1
Colorado 1 1 1 1 1
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 1 1
Delaware 1 1 1 1 1 1
District of Columbia 1 1
Florida 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 1 1 1 1 1 1
Hawaii 1 1 1 1 1
Idaho 1 1 1 1 1 1
Illinois 1 1 1 1 1
Indiana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iowa 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kansas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kentucky 1 1 1 1 1 1
Louisiana 1 1
Maine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maryland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Massachusetts 1 1 1 1 1 1
Michigan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mississippi 1
Missouri 1 1 1 1 1
Montana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nebraska 1 1 1 1 1
Nevada 1 1 1 1
New Hampshire 1 1 1 1 1
New Jersey 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Mexico 1
New York 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
North Carolina 1
North Dakota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ohio 1 1 1 1 1
Oklahoma 1 1 1 1
Oregon 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 1 1
Puerto Rico 1
Rhode Island 1 1 1 1 1
South Carolina 1
South Dakota 1 1 1 1 1
Tennessee 1 1 1 1 1
Texas 1
Utah 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vermont 1
Virgin Islands 1 1 1
Virginia 1
Washington 1 1 1 1 1
West Virginia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wisconsin 1
Wyoming 1
State and Other Select Jurisdictional (DC, PR, VI) Statutes
Addressing the Collateral Source Rule




1 5 7 2938 4 5 21 1710
Territory Total 0 0
State Total (including 
Washington D.C.) 38
1 1 0 0 0 1 00 0 0 0






Ei Eii Eiii Fi Fii Gi Gii Giii Hi Hii Hiii Hiv Hv Hvi Hvii Ii
Alabama 1 1 1 1 1
Alaska 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arizona 1 1 1 1 1 1
Arkansas 1
California 1 1 1 1 1 1
Colorado 1 1
Connecticut 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Delaware 1 1 1
District of Columbia 1
Florida 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 1 1 1 1
Hawaii 1 1 1 1
Idaho 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Illinois 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Indiana 1 1 1 1 1
Iowa 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kansas 1 1 1 1 1 1
Kentucky 1 1 1
Louisiana 1
Maine 1 1 1 1 1
Maryland 1 1 1 1
Massachusetts 1 1 1 1 1 1
Michigan 1 1 1 1 1 1
Minnesota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Mississippi 1
Missouri 1 1
Montana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Nebraska 1 1
Nevada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
New Hampshire 1 1 1 1
New Jersey 1 1
New Mexico 1
New York 1 1 1 1 1 1
North Carolina 1
North Dakota 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ohio 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Oklahoma 1 1 1 1 1
Oregon 1 1 1 1 1 1
Pennsylvania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
South Carolina
South Dakota 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tennessee 1 1 1
Texas 1
Utah 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vermont
Virgin Islands 1 1 1 1 1 1
Virginia
Washington 1 1 1 1 1 1
West Virginia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wisconsin
Wyoming
State and Other Select Jurisdictional (DC, PR, VI) Statutes













312 27State Total (including Washington D.C.) 28 26 18 16
G HState
292
Territory Total 00 1 1 1 0 01 0 10
Grand Total 16 612 28 29 302
9
1
1027 18
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